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ABSTRACT Market mechanisms are increasingly being used as a tool for allocating somewhat
scarce but unpriced rights and resources, and the European Emission Trading Scheme is an exam-
ple. By means of dynamic optimization in the contest of firms covered by such environmental
regulations, this article generates endogenously the price dynamics of emission permits under asym-
metric information, allowing inter-temporal banking and borrowing. In the market, there are a finite
number of firms and each firm’s pollution emission follows an exogenously given stochastic process.
We prove the discounted permit price is a martingale with respect to the relevant filtration. The
model is solved numerically. Finally, a closed-form pricing formula for European-style options is
derived.
KEY WORDS: Asymmetric information, environmental finance, European Emission Trading
Scheme, trading decisions
1. Introduction
During the last decade we have been witness to a significant increase in the atten-
tion given by both policymakers and regulators to market-based environmental policy
instruments. These are aimed at internalizing costs that previously had been met by
those external to the production process (see Pigou, 1918). Such policy instruments
have emerged as a more cost-effective alternative to conventional command-and-
control standards, which had dominated the previous two decades of environmental
laws and regulations.1 A programme for tradable permits generates a clear price signal
that guides firms in developing and evaluating new, more efficient pollution control
technologies. From a political perspective, emission-trading programmes are perceived
as fairer, and thus more acceptable, than other forms of environmental regulation as
they promote decentralized decision-making.
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2 M. Chesney and L. Taschini
One of the first references to market-based techniques for dealing with pollution
problems can be found in the seminal works of Coase (1960) and Dales (1968). In
these papers, the pollution abatement problem is viewed within an economic, cost–
benefit framework in conjunction with the concept of property rights: Their essays
propose the basic idea of tradeable permits. Based on such an idea, Montgomery
(1972) provides a rigorous theoretical justification of how a market-based approach
leads to the efficient allocation of abatement costs across various sources of pollution.
Necessary and sufficient conditions for market equilibrium and efficiency are derived
given the setting of multiple profit-maximizing firms who attempt to minimize total
compliance costs. Theoretical aspects that Montgomery (1972) does not discuss have
been addressed by several studies as reported in Taschini (2010). The author reviews
fundamental concepts in environmental economics and overviews recent attempts at
developing valid price models for emission permits. Literature focusing on the eco-
nomic and policy aspects of this new market-based mechanism is extensive, but an
explicit study of the dynamics of the emission permit price in the presence of market
uncertainty is an almost unexplored area. Most of the present research relies on the
theoretical result – demonstrated and extensively discussed by Cronshaw and Kruse
(1996) and Rubin (1996) – that, in an efficient market, the equilibrium price of the
emission permits (or allowances) is equal to the marginal costs of the cheapest pol-
lution abatement solution. This statement underpins the belief that a high price level
for emission permits brings about relevant companies with lower marginal abatement
costs in order to exploit consequent price differences. Such companies make profits by
lowering the level of offending gases more than is necessary to comply with regula-
tions and subsequently sell their spare permits. This result, however, is due to stylized
models that ignore uncertainty. Schennach (2000) attempts to overcome this limita-
tion by extending Rubin’s model (1996). This article is one of the first that implicitly
analyses the permit price in a stochastic, continuous-time and infinite-time horizon
model. In line with previous research, in the model of Schennach a level of pollution
abatement is chosen such that the current marginal cost of abating equals the current
permit spot price. Though the author does not provide an exact analytic solution for
the optimization problem in the presence of uncertainty, she conjectures that the actual
path of permit price and pollution emissions may be quite different from their expected
path.When new information becomes available, the optimization problem has to be re-
evaluated, possibly generating cusp or discontinuity in the path of pollution emissions
and of the price of emission permits. Anticipating our results, this is what we obtain in
the numerical solution of our model in Section 5.
Recently, in an effort to bridge the gap between theory and observed market-price
behaviour, an increasing number of empirical studies have been investigating the his-
torical time series of the permit price. In Daskalakis et al. (2009), several different
diffusion and jump–diffusion processes were fitted to the European carbon dioxide
(CO2) futures time series. Benz and Trück (2009) analyse the short-term spot price
behaviour of CO2 permits employing a Markov-switching model to capture the het-
eroskedastic behaviour of the return time series. In contrast, Paolella and Taschini
(2008) advocate the use of a new GARCH-type structure for the analysis of inherent
heteroskedastic dynamics in the returns of SO2 in the United States and of CO2
emission permits in the European Emission Trading Scheme (EU ETS).
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Endogenous Price Dynamics of Emission Allowances 3
With a precise focus on the European emission market and in an attempt to develop
a valid dynamic price model, Seifert et al. (2008) and Fehr and Hinz (2006) elaborate
a quantitative analysis of the CO2 permits price founded on the pivotal results from
environmental economics literature. These are two interesting papers in the increasing
body of literature on environmental finance, a new strand of research that is focusing
on financial and quantitative issues originating from solutions proposed by environ-
mental economists. In particular, Seifert et al. (2008) consider one representative agent
who decides whether to spend money on lowering emission levels. The model is based
on the optimal abatement decision of an affected company, therefore it very much
depends on its total expected emissions. With a distinction between long-term and
short-term abatement measures, Fehr and Hinz (2006) concentrate on the energy sec-
tor considering n affected utilities that decide their abatement levels by relying on the
cheapest possible abatement option in the short term, that is so-called fuel-switching.2
In our article, we generate endogenously the price dynamics of marketable permits
under asymmetric information, allowing banking and borrowing. The basic set-up
is a permit market lasting a finite T number of periods. In common with the last-
mentioned paper, we differentiate short-term and long-term abatement measures. As
extensively discussed in Section 3, a few options are available to themajority of affected
companies and even fewer fall into the list of so-called short-term abatement pos-
sibilities. As a result, in the short-run it is relatively difficult to modify production
processes or outputs. Accordingly, we assume each firm’s pollution emission follows
an exogenously given stochastic process. There are a finite number of firms and the ini-
tial allocation of permits in each period to these firms is pre-determined and publicly
known. In each period, a firm knows its own accumulated pollution level and those
of the other firms up to the previous period. This allows us to model the asymmetry
in the information. At the end of the time T , firms reconcile their permit holding with
the accumulated emissions: if a firm’s permit holding is less than its accumulated pol-
lution, it has to pay a penalty for each permit in shortage at a pre-determined rate. The
firm’s strategy is to choose the optimal number of permits to buy or sell in each period
up to time T −!t. The firms’ trading decisions and the market-clearing condition in
each period determines the equilibrium permit price and the instantaneous volume of
emission permits traded in the market. We prove that the price path of emission per-
mits depends on the future probability of a shortfall in permits, the penalty that will
be paid in the event of a shortfall, and the discount rate. The intuition is that the price
of emission permits at each time t should reflect the firms’ perception about scarcity
or excess of permits in the market based on the information available at time t.
Optimal strategies are readily computable in a static and deterministic framework.
Conversely, regulatory uncertainties and uncertainties in the evolution of the pollution
processes make an identification of the best strategy less straightforward in the short
term. Apart from technological issues (see the discussion in Section 3) and regula-
tory uncertainties, financial concerns are also beginning to creep in. Observed extreme
volatility in the European and US permit markets suggests an urgent need for the
development of effective hedging techniques.3 In addition, the numerous risks related
to market-based products highlight the importance of developing appropriate risk-
management tools for those companies that are subject to environmental programmes,
as well as to specialized traders. More importantly, a valid price model is required for
any financial instruments or project whose value derives from the future CO2 spot
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4 M. Chesney and L. Taschini
permit price. Extremely relevant examples are project-based investments (see the dis-
cussion in Section 6), that at regular intervals return emission reduction certificates,
yielding a payoff that depends on the CO2 permit market price.
The organization of the remaining sections of this article is as follows: Section 2
briefly introduces market-based products as instruments for pollution control and
describes the EU ETS market. Section 3 addresses the fundamental distinction
between long-term and short-term abatement policies. Section 4.1 presents the model
and its formulation for the basic case of one company with emission-trading oppor-
tunity only at time 0. Then, we extend the model to account for the presence of the
firms’ permit trading decisions and asymmetric information. Section 5 numerically
solves the model. Section 6 derives a closed-form pricing formula for European-style
options. Section 7 concludes.
2. Environmental Programme for Air-control
A tradable permits scheme for air pollution control is constructed as follows: Emission
allowances are denominated in units of a specific pollutant (e.g. in tons of CO2).
Emission permits are issued to relevant facilities in amounts proportional to their
size and emissions according to a referred year as baseline. For a detailed discussion
about initial allocation criteria see Bahn et al. (1999) and references therein. At regu-
lar intervals, facilities submit emission reports for their compliance period, at the end
of which facilities must own sufficient permits to cover their emissions. This implies
that each facility must hold at least as many valid credits as emissions during the com-
pliance period. A penalty is levied if a facility does not deliver a sufficient amount of
allowances at the end of the compliance period. The payment of a fine does not remove
the obligation to achieve compliance, which means that undelivered permits have to be
handed in. Having been used to cover emissions, these credits are then deleted from the
regulatory compliance system, preventing subsequent use or transfer. The compliance
date marks the end of each period for which a facility has to file an emissions report,
which is due on the certification date.
The largest and most important emission-trading programme was developed by the
European Union to facilitate implementation of the Kyoto Protocol. The EU ETS
covers more than five different industrial sectors and almost 12,000 installations in
25 countries, responsible for nearly half of the EU’s CO2 emissions. They have been
allocated allowances giving them the right, over the first phase (2005–2007), to emit
6.6 billion tons of CO2. The second phase coincides with the first Kyoto commitment
period, beginning in 2008 and continuing through 2012. The third phase will run from
2013 to 2020. The EU ETS has created de facto property rights for emissions that
are freely tradable. All permits are transferable, that is a facility that generates excess
permits by reducing emissions below its allocated levels can sell those extra credits to
other relevant entities. In addition to the so-called spatial trading,4 both schemes allow
for inter-temporal trading, so that companies can save their allowances for use in the
future. This is reflected by a larger time flexibility for pollution-control investments.
In particular, starting from phase II the EU ETS allows within phase banking, that is
allowances can be banked from 1 year to the next, and from one phase to the next.
Unused allowances, however, are not valid during the following phase.
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Endogenous Price Dynamics of Emission Allowances 5
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Figure 1. The solid line is the empirical price of the CO2 emission permits. The dashed line is the
cost to switch from cheap-but-dirty coal to expensive-but-cleaner natural gas (it is an approxima-
tion of the marginal cost of abatement). The historical coal-to-gas switching price is calculated
by considering the ratio (hg Gt – hc Ct)/(ec – eg), where hc and hg are average heating rates of coal
and gas; ec and eg correspond to average CO2 emissions for coal and gas, respectively. In Europe
standard heat factors are hc = 0.378 tcoal/MWh and hg = 1.92 MWhtherm/MWh. The average
CO2 emission factors for coal and gas are ec = 0.897 tCO2/MWh and eg = 0.388 tCO2/MWh.
Ct and Gt are the time series of coal and gas prices. Time series was run from April 2005 to July
2007.
The economic incentives embedded in the tradable permits are designed to force
companies to participate in the permits market. This leads to a theoretical equaliza-
tion of marginal abatement costs across different pollution sources. However, currently
the observed permit price does not coincide with the expected theoretical level (see
Figure 1).5 Though this might be ascribed to a market that is in the initial stage of
development, in section 3 we will attempt to address directly the reasons why this
mismatch is present.
3. Abatement Opportunities in the Short Term
According to the market-based approach that we have described, a generating unit
is endowed with high flexibility in determining the best strategy of achieving com-
pliance under the programmes: each firm faces a basic choice between buying (or
selling) allowances, and reducing emissions through the use of alternative technolo-
gies. Three general classes of techniques for the physical reduction of emissions are
available. Firstly, emissions can be reduced by lowering the output scale. Secondly,
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6 M. Chesney and L. Taschini
the production process or the inputs used – e.g. fuels – can be altered. Finally, tail-
end cleaning equipment can be installed to remove pollutants from effluent streams
before they are released into the environment. European firms, in order to accomplish
Europe’s severe environmental regulations, have mostly achieved high environmen-
tal standards either in production processes or in the reduction of offending gases
released as a by-product into the air. This implies that currently it is relatively diffi-
cult to actively reduce further on pollution emissions in the short term. Here, we do
not consider the situation of an exogenous slowdown of the economy. Therefore, the
first abatement alternative can be considered as the exception rather than the rule (see
Hidalgo et al. (2005) and Szabö et al. (2006) for a more comprehensive discussion).
A market-based approach leads to an efficient allocation of abatement costs across
different pollution sources, as shown by Montgomery (1972). However, this heavily
depends on the implicit assumption that emission allowances are perceived as a perfect
substitute for any technological abatement solution, for instance, the installation of
scrubbers on smokestacks to extract noxious fumes as solid residues.6 This only holds
true in an efficient market with no uncertainty. Those facilities that are affected, on the
contrary, face considerable uncertainty. Chao and Wilson (1993) show that companies
perceive abatement technologies – in particular scrubber plants for sulfur dioxide – as
inferior substitutes for emission allowances. In contrast to emission permits, invest-
ments in pollution-reduction infrastructures are irrevocable commitments that last for
decades and typically need some lead time in order to become effective. (For a more
extensive discussion refer to Farzin and Kort (2000) and Zhao (2003).) The purchase
of allowances is adjustable to changing market conditions whereas a scrubber might be
underutilized if demand falls. Moreover, the cost of a scrubber might be excessive fol-
lowing a fall in permit price. Hence, since pollution abatement technologies are often
expensive, durable and irreversible investments, they are not commonly deemed to be
a perfect substitute for emission permits. In the EU ETS, fuel-burning energy produc-
ers have one of the cheapest abatement alternatives, that is so-called fuel-switching.
Though this change in the production process has been implemented in few instal-
lations, it is hard to justify it took place only based on the then CO2 price level –
especially when the permit price was hovering above zero. Further, there are several
reasonable explanations that can provide elements of irreversibility to fuel-switching
decisions. For instance, Insley (2003) discusses the case of fuel contracts with long
maturities in order to lock in a particular price premium.
Taking a real option perspective, one could say that the equilibrium price of emis-
sion permits should reflect the marginal cost of pollution abatement and the value of
the option to delay a large (irreversible or reversible) expenditure on modifying the
production process or on pollution abatement equipment. As long as buying permits
is perceived the most flexible alternative, the price of emission permits should reflect
the probability of having to buy additional permits to satisfy regulations, which is the
focus of this article. Plausibly, other sources of uncertainties, for instance regulatory
uncertainty or an economic shock, can distort the theoretical equilibrium price, but
the overall effect would always be a mismatch. Following this line of reasoning, we
develop an equilibrium model for the short-term permit price. We propose possible
model extensions for the inclusion of general technological abatement measures or
production management decisions based on daily CO2 price movements, but we leave
this investigation for future research.
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Endogenous Price Dynamics of Emission Allowances 7
4. The Formal Model
4.1 ‘Wait-and-see’ for One Company
In the tradable permit price modelling, as outlined by Montgomery (1972), the exis-
tence of an efficient market has been generally assumed. This leads to an equalization
of marginal abatement costs across the different pollution emitters and to an emer-
gence of an alignment of companies’ interests with those of a representative agent (as in
Seifert et al. (2008)), or with a social planner (as in Fehr and Hinz (2006)).7 Employing
the existence of a single representative firm in the market as in Seifert et al. (2008), we
model the permit price process in a simplified setting where trading is only possible at
the inception of an environmental programme that has a finite length T . Addressing
the cost minimization problem, we derive the permit price in analytic form.
Let (",F ,P) be the probability space, F = (F0) the filtration where F0 = σ (Q0).
We denote with Q0 the initial pollution level and with X0 the quantity of permits that
the company buys (X0 > 0) or sells (X0 < 0) at time 0, and with N the initial permits
endowment. We label δ0 the overall net amount of permits for the company at initial
time, where δ0 = N + X0 and it gives the company the right to emit a volume of offend-
ing gases up to such a level. We assume that the firm continuously emits offending gas
according to a stochastic exogenous process over the period [0,T ]. The process evolves
accordingly to a geometric Brownian motion:
dQt
Qt
= µdt+ σdWt, or equivalently Qt = Q0e(µ− σ
2
2 )t+σWt , (1)
where µ and σ are the instantaneously constant drift term and the constant volatil-
ity of the pollution process, respectively. The assumption of a geometric Brownian
motion leads to a natural interpretation of its parameters. Q0 · ∫ T0 eµtdt can be inter-
preted as the expected cumulated pollution level between 0 and T , while the drift and
the volatility are the trend and the uncertainty associated with the emission process.
Also, the EU ETS concerns a total volume control of pollution because of the exis-
tence of a threshold in the stock of CO2 in the atmosphere and not in the flow. In
fact, we are interested in a (non-decreasing) quantity that measures the accumulated
pollution volume. Therefore, the assumption of a geometric Brownian motion is not
unrealistic, and the quantity
∫ t
0 Qsds is precisely what we look for. Besides, it has also
nice mathematical properties. Thereby, a negative µ implies a lower rate of accumu-
lation of pollution maybe due to a previous technological improvement, whereas σ
measures the uncertainty about the accumulated pollution volume. A natural exten-
sion of the model would be the introduction of an endogenous pollution process. This
would account for the situation where firms are able to respond to changes in current
prices and in expectations of future prices by adjusting their emission levels. As dis-
cussed before, this will not be the case under our study that concentrates on the short
term.
As described in Section 2, in order to pollute legally, the company must have enough
allowances by the end of the period T . If the firm fails to achieve compliance, it will
pay a penalty equal to P. More precisely, in the EU ETS penalty costs may occur at the
end of every year. However, the European Directive allows a 1-year borrowing within
a trading period. This means that companies are allowed to use allowances with future
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8 M. Chesney and L. Taschini
maturity for compliance in the current year without having to buy the permits in the
market. It is thus not unreasonable to assume that companies will not pay penalties
for a shortfall within a particular trading period. At the end of the period we expect
either a shortage or a surplus situation (or possibly a perfect match) between the issued
emission allowances and the verified pollution level. Inevitably, the company will be
either holding worthless emission allowances or paying the price for being uncovered –
i.e. the penalty P times the number of uncovered tons – or be totally and perfectly
hedged. Yet, as this last possibility is quite unlikely, the final cash outflow boils down
to a binary outcome. In fact, the firm’s final cost in a wait-and-see situation without
any trading opportunity during the period [0,T ] is
max
{
0,
(∫ T
0
Qsds− δ0
)}
· P, (2)
where
∫ T
0 Qsds is the firm final accumulated pollution level. From expression (2) it is
obvious that emission allowances – like many other marketable permits – are to all
intents option contracts. Several features shared with standard options contracts are
discussed in the forthcoming numerical section.
Given the initial endowment of permits and the expected net position in future
permits, a firm minimizes its costs at the inception of the period. The total cost is
simply the sum of the cash flows at initial time (or minus the proceeds from permits
sales) and the potential penalties at the end of the programme. Therefore, the resulting
minimization problem is
min{X0}
S0 · X0 + e−ηTEP
[(∫ T
0
Qsds− δ0
)+
· P|F0
] , (3)
where the expectation is taken under the historical probability measure P,8 η is the
discount rate – the weighted average cost of capital – and S0 is the permit price (known)
at time t = 0. Problem (3) expresses in quantitative terms the firm’s strategy described
in Section 1: the firm’s aim is to have a portfolio of emission permits at-the-money at
time T .
In order to express the permit price in analytic form, we rely on Geman and Yor
(1993) and write the objective function as follows:
H ≡
S0 · X0 + e−ηTEP
[(∫ T
0
Qsds−N − X0
)+
· P
]
with
∫ T
0
Qsds = 4
σ 2
·Q0
∫ σ 2T/4
0
e2(W˜u+zu)du =: 4
σ 2
·Q0 · Azσ 2T/4
z := 2ν
σ
, ν := 1
σ
·
(
µ− σ
2
2
)
and W˜u := σ2W4u/σ 2 is a Brownian motion.
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Endogenous Price Dynamics of Emission Allowances 9
Finally, we denote AνT =
∫ T
0 e
2(Ws+νs)ds.
Computing the first-order condition (FOC), X0 satisfies the following equation (the
detailed derivation is in Appendix A):
S0 = e−ηT · P ·
∫ ∞
δ0·σ 2/4Q0
P
[
Azσ 2T/4 ∈ dx
]
. (4)
It is observable that the emission allowance spot price is a function of the penalty
level and the probability of a permit shortage situation. The functional form of such
probability is known, but unfortunately is problematic to evaluate numerically. For
illustrative purposes, therefore, we let T be an arbitrary small time interval (T = !t)
and then compute the discrete approximation of
∫ T
0 Qsds. This enables us to derive a
more intuitive analytical form for the permit spot price (the detailed derivation is in
Appendix A):
S0 = e−ηT [P ·'(d−)] , where d− = ln(Q0 ·!t/δ0)+ (µ−
σ 2
2 )!t
σ
√
!t
, (5)
and '(x) is the standard cumulative distribution function '(x) = 1√
2pi
∫ x
−∞ e
− u22 du. In
Equation (5), the price of the emission permits reflects the probability of having to buy
additional permits, i.e. the probability to not satisfy regulation, which corresponds to
the event {∫ T0 Qsds > δ0}.9
In Figure 2, we give a graphical interpretation of Equation (5). Let us consider the
case where the permit price, S0, is (exogenously) given. The objective here is to inves-
tigate the impact of different price level (low price, high price) on the permit trading
strategy,X0. The objective of each regulated company is to achieve compliance at mini-
mum cost. A regulated firm, in principle, should buy theminimum or sell the maximum
150
(a) (b)
100
50
0
–50
–100
–150
150
σ = 0
σ = 0.15
σ = 0.30 µ = 0.35
µ = 0.15
µ = –0.15
100
50
0
–50
–100
–150
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 0 5 10 15 20
S0S0
X0 X0
25 30 35 40
Figure 2. Plot of the number of permits, X0, as a function of the permit price, S0. We plot
the permit price for (a) different
{
σ : σ ∈ R+} , and (b) different {µ : µ ∈ R}, keeping all other
parameters constant. When not otherwise specified in the legend, the parameters used in this
example are N = 170, P = 40, σ = 0.15, µ = 0, and the initial emission level is Q0 = 100.
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10 M. Chesney and L. Taschini
number of permits that guarantees such objective. By considering the minimization
problem in Equation (3) and using an arbitrary set of parameters, Figure 2 explains
the logic behind this argument. Under certainty, the firm achieves perfect compliance
by selling 50 permits, i.e. X0 = −50. In such a scenario, this is the optimal solution:
the firm is not better off by selling one extra unit more or less. Moreover, the trading
strategy is independent of the permit price level, S0. Under uncertainty, instead, there
is a trade-off between the permit price and the opportunity cost to be in compliance
with the regulations. Contingent on the permit price, the firm may be better off by
trading more or less permits. When the price is high, the company sells more (buys
less) permits and bears the potential costs to be non-compliant. Conversely, when the
price is low, the company sells less (buys more) permits. Such a trading behaviour is
graphically represented by an inverse ‘S’. This S-shaped graph is more pronounced
when σ is higher (a) and it is simply shifted upward and downward depending on the
parameter µ (b). It is worth noticing that this pattern resembles the graphical results
of the equilibrium spot price in Seifert et al. (2008).
4.2 Two-companies and Multi-periods Trading
A market for tradable permits is clearly different from the oversimplified situation of
a representative agent described above. Not just one representative agent, but different
companies operate at the same time on the market. Therefore, the resulting interac-
tion of the companies’ optimization strategies must be properly taken into account.
Furthermore, as discussed in Section 3, several technical and operational factors con-
tribute to the uncertainty observed in emission levels and to the perception of a
larger flexibility for the emission permits compared with other abatement measures.
These factors include also uncertainty in the demand for companies’ goods and ser-
vices. This results in a variation in the production activity levels, measurement and
monitoring uncertainty. These, coupled with imperfect information regarding emis-
sion levels (which is explicitly modelled in this article), typically lead to the facilities
ending up either short of or in excess of emission permits. Both of these are highly
undesirable scenarios. The former results in excessive emissions in the environment
in conjunction with high violation penalties for the facilities while the latter repre-
sents unrealized productive and/or market value for the firm. As a result, facilities
are forced to participate in the market in order to reconcile their emission credit
accounts. They do this by either selling or buying permits. Historical price evidence
suggests that many of the affected firms dynamically adjust their positions, thus
ensuring compliance, by purchasing or selling the difference between their allowance
allocation and their expected net future emission.10 In what follows we extend the
basic model, accommodating it to the interaction of two firms that trade in a multi-
period setting and to the presence of asymmetric information regarding emission
levels. To simplify matters, we do not account for the possibility of trading the emis-
sion certificates generated by Joint Implementation or Clean DevelopmentMechanism
projects.11
Let (",F , {Ft} ,P) be the probability space, F = (Ft)t≥0 be the filtration where
Ft = {∩i∈IIF it}, F it = {G it ∪j∈I, j )=i G jt−1}, G it = σ (Qis, s ∈ [0, t]), and I = 1, . . . , I .
Each firm continuously emits offending gas accordingly to an exogenous process:
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Endogenous Price Dynamics of Emission Allowances 11
dQi,t
Qi,t
= µidt+ σidWi,t,
where we assume dWi,t · dWj,t = 0 for {i, j ∈ I, i )= j}.12 We denote with Xi,t and Ni,
respectively, the quantity of permits that the ith company buys or sells and the initial
permits endowment. In a cap-and-trade, as the EU ETS, the GHG reduction target is
settled at the inception of each phase; therefore, the supply side of pollution permits
is indeed fixed and for I = {1, 2} is equal to N = N1 +N2. The net amount of permits
that the ith company possesses at time t is denoted by
δi,t := Ni +
t∑
s=0
Xi,s ∀ t = 1, 2, . . . ,T − 1, i = {1, 2} ,
where
∑t
s=0 Xi,s is the sum of the marginal quantities of emission permits bought minus
those sold by company i excluding the initial permit endowment.
Given that the total number of permits is fixed, the market-clearing condition is
δ1,t + δ2,t = N or in another form X1,t = −X2,t ∀ t = 0, 1, . . . ,T − 1. (6)
Condition (6) implies that in equilibrium the permit positions are in zero net sup-
ply. Hence, it satisfies the competitive equilibrium condition that requires equality
between supply and demand for pollution permits in the market. We label the ith
net-accumulated pollution volume at time t as
∫ t
0 Qi,sds− δi,t−1. We explicitly model
the presence of asymmetric information regarding emission levels as follows: In
each period t ∈ [0,T − 1], company i knows its own net-accumulated pollution level,∫ t
0 Qi,sds− δi,t−1, and that of the other firm up to the previous period,
∫ t−1
0 Qj,sds−
δj,t−1. In other words, the asymmetry means a lag-effect on the information available
to a firm about the other firm’s emissions. This certainly holds in practice, since firms
usually do not know precisely how much other firms (not necessarily competitors) pol-
lute. We consider the particular case of a lag-size equal to one unit of time. Without
loss of generality, we can extend the model to the case where the lag-size equals n units
of time, where n > 1. This is discussed in Section 5.
At time T , if neither of the company is in a permit need, all left-over permits have
zero value. Conversely, if at least one of the firms is in permit shortage, since by law
all covered companies have to surrender sufficient credits at time T , the permit has
a value equal to the penalty level P. This holds assuming that each firm in shortage
is indifferent to purchase permits and to penalty payments. This implies we assign
market power to firms in excess of emission permits. Analytically, the permit value at
time T is
ST =
{
0 if ∀ i ∈ I ∫ T0 Qi,sds ≤ δi,T−1
P if ∃ i ∈ I ∫ T0 Qi,sds > δi,T−1 . (7)
In accordance with the emission market construction at time T , if company i is in
permit excess, it can sell to company j what the latter wants to buy:
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12 M. Chesney and L. Taschini
min
{(
δi,T−1 −
∫ T
0
Qi,sds
)+
,
(∫ T
0
Qj,sds− δj,T−1
)+}
=: ). (8)
On the other hand, if company i is in permit shortage, it can buy from company j what
the latter wants to sell:
min
{(∫ T
0
Qi,sds− δi,T−1
)+
,
(
δj,T−1 −
∫ T
0
Qj,sds
)+}
=: *. (9)
However, if
(∫ T
0 Q1,sds− δ1,T−!t
)+ −* > 0, by law company i has to pay P per unit
of emitted pollution not covered by the permits. Thus, combining Equations (8) and
(9), we can simplify the boundary conditions for the permit quantity at time T to
Xi,T =
(∫ T
0
Qi,sds− δi,T−1
)+
− ), ∀ i ∈ I .
Unlike the one-firm model in Section 4.1, this last quantity captures the potential loss
implied by the zero-redemption value of unsold permits.
To solve the problem, we consider !t to be the unit time and we discretize the
model. Given the initial permit endowments and expectations on the accumulated pol-
lution volumes, each firm minimizes its total costs at every time t ∈ [0,T −!t]. The
minimization problem for company i = 1 at time T −!t is
min{X1,T−!t}
{
ST−!t · X1,T−!t + e−η!tEP [ST · X1,T |F 1T−!t]} .
And deriving the FOC:
ST−!t = e−η!t · P · EP
[
1∫ T
0 Q1,sds>δ1,T−!t
|F 1T−!t
]
+ e−η!t · P · EP
[
1
δ1,T−!t>
∫ T
0 Q1,sds
· 1∫ T
0 Q2,sds>δ2,T−!t
|F 1T−!t
]
.
(10)
Since
∫ t
0 Qi,sds is a monotonically non-decreasing function in t, it follows
EP
[
1∫ T
0 Q1,sds>δ1,T−!t
|F 1T−!t
]
=
 1 if
∫ T−!t
0 Q1,sds ≥ δ1,T−!t
'(d1,T−!t) else
where
d1,T−!t =
ln
(
Q1,T−!t·!t
δ1,T−2!t+X1,T−!t−∫ T−!t0 Q1,sds
)
+
(
µ1 − σ 212
)
·!t
σ1 ·
√
!t
.
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Endogenous Price Dynamics of Emission Allowances 13
Let for the moment L := [1
δ1,T−!t>
∫ T
0 Q1,sds
· 1∫ T
0 Q2,sds>δ2,T−!t
], by independence:13
EP
[
L|F 1T−!t
] =

0 if
∫ T−!t
0 Q1,sds ≥ δ1,T−!t
'(−d1,T−!t) if ∫ T−!t0 Q1,sds ≤ δ1,T−!t and ∫ T−2!t0 Q2,sds ≥ δ2,T−!t
'(−d1,T−!t) ·'(d lag2,T−!t) else,
where
d lag2,T−!t =
ln
(
Q2,T−2!t·2!t
δ2,T−2!t+X2,T−!t−∫ T−2!t0 Q2,sds
)
+
(
µ2 − σ 222
)
· 2!t
σ2 ·
√
2!t
.
Moving on from this, we can then express the price of emission permits analytically
for company 1 at time T −!t as the discounted penalty level weighted by the shortage
probabilities (for the computations, see Appendix B):
ST−!t = e−η!t · P · [1− P1T−!t], (11)
where
P1T−!t =
{
0 if
∫ T−!t
0 Q1,sds ≥ δ1,T−!t or
∫ T−2!t
0 Q2,sds ≥ δ2,T−!t
'(−d1,T−!t) ·'(−d lag2,T−!t) else.
In other words, P1T−!t represents the probability of having no future shortfalls for both
companies from the point of view of company 1.
Similarly, solving the optimization problem for company 2, it follows:
ST−!t = e−η!t · P · [1− P2T−!t] , (12)
where
P2T−!t =
{
0 if
∫ T−!t
0 Q2,sds ≥ δ2,T−!t or
∫ T−2!t
0 Q1,sds ≥ δ1,T−!t
'(−d2,T−!t) ·'(−d lag1,T−!t) else .
Here d2,T−!t and d lag1,T−!t are defined similarly as above. Also, P2T−!t represents the
probability of having no future shortfalls for both companies from the point of
view of company 2. For the sake of simplicity, we use the same discounting factor
η for both companies. A generalization taking two different discounting factors is
straightforward.
Moving backwards and repeating the optimization procedure at each time step k ∈
[1, 2, . . . ,T/!t], we obtain a pair (i )= j) of emission price equations:
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14 M. Chesney and L. Taschini
ST−k!t =
 e
−ηk!t · P if ∫ T−k!t0 Qi,sds ≥ δi,T−k!t or ∫ T−k!t0 Qj,sds ≥ δj,T−k!t
e−ηk!t · P · {1− EP['(−di,T−k!t) ·'(−d lagj,T−k!t)|F iT−k!t]} else.
(13)
At each time step, when the total emissions do not exceed the net amount of permits,
we determine the firms’ trading decisions by numerically evaluating the quantity of
permits that satisfies the following equality:
EP
[
'(−di,T−!t) ·'(−d lagj,T−!t)|F iT−k!t
]
= EP
[
'(−dj,T−!t) ·'(−d lagi,T−!t)|F jT−k!t
]
,
(14)
for a given set of parameters {µ, σ ,Q0,N0} that characterize the two pollution pro-
cesses. Given firms’ trading decisions, the market-clearing condition (6) determines
the equilibrium permit price. Equation (13) is derived in Appendix C, where we show
that when the total emissions do not exceed the net amount of permits:
St = e−η!tEP [St+!t|F it ] = e−η(T−t)EP [ST |F it ] , i ∈ {1, 2} . (15)
The discounted equilibrium price of emission permits is easily shown to be a martin-
gale with respect to the information set common to the polluters. We formalize this
property of the model in the following proposition.
Proposition 1. The discounted equilibrium price process
{
St
}T
t=0 is a martingale
with respect to the information setFt:
EP
[
ST |F 1t ∩F 2t
]
= EP [EP [ST |F 1t ] |F 1t ∩F 2t ]
= EP
[
eη(T−t)St|F 1t ∩F 2t
]
= eη(T−t)St.
Therefore, the permit price dynamics does not allow for arbitrage opportunities as the
model in Seifert et al. (2008).
4.3 Multi-firm and Multi-periods Trading
A ready extension of the model to multi-firm is possible splitting the set I =
{1, 2, . . . , I} into two parts, I− := I − i and i, and assuming firm i knows the accumu-
lated pollution level of other firms I− in aggregate. Using constant drift and volatility
terms, {µ ∈ RI−1 and σ ∈ R+I−1}, and relying on standard technique of the methods of
moments, one can approximate the cumulative pollution process,QI−,t =∑Ij=1, j )=i Qj,t,
with a new geometric Brownian motion (see Brigo et al. 2004). Along similar lines of
Section 4.2, the equilibrium permit price result from the solution of a system of I
equations (see Appendix D). We formalize the extension of the model in the following
proposition.
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Endogenous Price Dynamics of Emission Allowances 15
Proposition 2. Given the exogenous pollution processes Qi,u, u = 0, . . . , t for t =
0, . . . ,T −!T and company i = 1, 2, . . . I , the I permit quantities Xi,t for i =
1, 2, . . . , I and for j = 1, 2, . . . , I , i )= j satisfy the following I–1 equations:
EP
[P it |F it ] = EP [P I−t |F jt ] , I = I− ∪ i, (16)
where
Pt =
{
0 if
∫ t
0 Qi,sds ≥ δi,t or
∫ t−!t
0 QI−,sds ≥ δI−,t
'(−di,t) ·'(−d lagI−,t) else ,
and the market-clearing condition
∑I
i=1 Xi,t = 0 for all t = 0, . . . ,T −!t.
The price process S = {St}Tt=0 uniquely defined as
St = e−η(T−t) · P · {1− EP [P it |F it ]} (17)
is the equilibrium permit price process.
It is remarkable to notice that, at each time step, both the permits traded-quantity and
the permit price, in equilibrium, are the result of the companies’ dynamic adjusting of
emission portfolio allocations based on the accumulated pollution processes and the
available information about net permit positions. In Section 5, we delve deeper into
these aspects by means of an extensive numerical exercise.
5. Numerical Evaluation
For illustrative purposes we consider I = 2. Based on Equation (14) and the market-
clearing condition (6), we simulate several paths of the emission permit price. In each
simulation exercise, we purposely choose Ni ≈ Qi,0 · ∫ T0 eµi tdt. Also, the time period T
is fixed at 1 year (i.e. 250 trading days, !t), the weighted average cost of capital is set
at 10% and the penalty, P, is equal to 40.
Starting at t = 0, and using Equation (1), we simulate a pair of independent pol-
lution processes: one for each company i, i ∈ I . Then, each firm chooses the optimal
number of permits to buy or to sell. Solving Equation (14) coupled with the market-
clearing condition (6), we (numerically) determine the permit quantities and, using
Equation (13), the equilibrium permit price S10. This procedure is repeated n-times to
evaluate the expected equilibrium permit price S0 :=∑nj=1 Sj0/n. At time t = !t, the
resulting net-permits positions (δi,0; i = 1, 2) are evaluated using S0 and a fixed pair of
accumulated pollution volumes, randomly chosen among the n pairs of pollution sim-
ulations. Repeating n-times the procedure described above, we compute the expected
equilibrium permit price S!t. Reiterating this at each time step up to T −!t, we
obtain the simulated equilibrium permit price history depicted in the bottom diagram
Figure 3.
Figures 3 and 4 illustrate the equilibrium permit price evolution stopped at three dif-
ferent time steps (50, 150 and 200 days) of the described procedure. In particular, the
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18 M. Chesney and L. Taschini
upper two diagrams show many possible paths of the pollution process after 50, 150
and 200 days. The bottom diagram shows the equilibrium permit price path condi-
tioned on the information sets F50,F150 and F200, respectively. Figure 3 depicts a
situation where both companies’ pollution processes have a positive quick-paced drift
of 15% and 10%, respectively, and a mild volatility level, set at 10% for both. While the
second firm has been equipped with an initial permit endowment approximately equal
to its expected pollution level,Q2,0 · ∫ T0 eµ2tdt, the first firm has been allocated an initial
amount of permits slightly smaller than Q1,0 · ∫ T0 eµ1tdt. As observable in the bottom
diagram of Figure 3, the relative scarcity of permits becomes clear as time goes by and
uncertainty is resolved. Modifying the pollution drift terms and setting, respectively,
a negative value for the first firm, µ1 = −0.15, and a negligible drift term for the sec-
ond one, µ2 = 0.001, we observe a reverse effect, other things being equal. The bottom
diagram of Figure 4 shows that the combination of initial amount of permits chosen,
N0 = (52; 25), and a negative drift result in a low price.
Figure 5 depicts a brief sensitivity analysis of the equilibrium permit price with
respect to the parameters of the companies’ pollution processes. Starting from a set
of conveniently chosen parameters, that is µ = (0.25; 0.20), σ = (0.15; 0.40), Q0 =
(50; 25), N0 = (60; 40), we let the drift and volatility terms of company 1 vary, both
in the first and in the second picture, keeping all the other parameters constant. As
expected, the larger µ1 is, the higher is the probability of being in shortage by the end
of the period, i.e. T . This reasonably implies an upward trend in the permit price. As
time moves forward and uncertainty is resolved, the initial permit endowments are
sufficiently large to lead to a price decrease (Figure 5a). However, in the particular
simulated exercise, it appears that the price increases (to 40) in three of the cases, and
decreases (to 0) in the other three.
Similarly, the larger σ1 is, the higher is the uncertainty about
∫ T
t Q1,sds− δ1,T−!t, i.e.
the net permit position before the compliance date, and consequently about the prob-
ability of having no future shortfalls for both companies, i.e. P it , t ∈ [0,T −!t]. As
can be observed, a volatility increase does not necessarily increases the permit price.
When there is no clear permit shortage, higher volatility uncertainty is reflected in a
higher permit price. Conversely, the permit price is simply equal to the discounted
penalty level. In our particular simulated example, while more information about the
accumulated pollution volumes is collected, the current permit amount value takes
precedence over the overall uncertainty level. This, in turn, leads to a price decrease
(Figure 5b). Finally, the impact of different pairs of initial permit endowments is
observable (Figure 5c). The upper line depicts a clear shortage situation. After some
trading time, the shortage status becomes a fact and the permit price is simply the
discounted penalty level. The lower line depicts the opposite situation. Both compa-
nies have been allocated an amount of permits that is over-generous and the permit
price hovers slightly above zero (Figure 5c). It is extremely interesting to observe that
the middle dashed-price path very closely resembles the empirical spot permit price
of CO2 in the European market during 2005–2007. After a period of slow but contin-
uous upward movement, due to purchasers being convinced of a shortage, the price
plummeted by almost 70% in almost one day, thereafter drifting towards 0. This price
reverse can be attributed to the disappearance of asymmetric information among mar-
ket players in terms of their net permits positions. By the end of 2007, the emission
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Figure 5. St permit price evolution letting vary the drift and the volatility terms for company
1, (a) and (b), and both the initial permits endowments (c). When not otherwise specified in
the legend, parameter used in the numerical exercise are µ = [−0.15; 0.001], σ = [0.10; 0.10],
Q0 = [50; 25], N0 = [52; 25].
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Figure 6. St permit price evolution letting vary the length of the lags, lag = [!t, 2!t, 4!t]. The
parameter used in the numerical exercise are µ = [0.05; 0.001], σ = [0.10; 0.10], Q0 = [50; 25],
N0 = [52; 25].
permit spot price for phase I is almost nil; however, it would have been zero only if
the probability of an excess situation had been exactly one. This feature, along with
the described price reaction to drift and volatility movement, is common to standard
financial option contracts. Finally, it is interesting to observe which is the impact of a
longer length of the information lag. In particular, we tested the situation where the
length of the information lags is two-time (2!t) and four-time longer (4!t) than the
previous examples. Figure 6 shows the impact we observe on the price paths caused by
varying the lag. The result is consistent with what we would expect: shortening the lag
causes the uncertainty about the net permit position to be resolved earlier.
6. Application to Option Pricing
A CO2 option market is slowly growing and attracting a wide variety of industrials,
utilities and financial institutions of various nature. The importance of such a market
is two-fold. First, CO2 option contracts satisfy the primary need of risk transfer from
those who wish to reduce the risk of a permit shortage situation, namely the risk of
financial exposure, to those willing to accept it. By allowing European covered com-
panies to reduce their exposure to price risk, buyers and sellers can better plan their
businesses. Furthermore, any project-based investment, that is investments commit-
ted under the so-called CDM and JI mechanisms, which at regular intervals returns
CO2 emission reduction certificates yielding a pay-off that depends on the CO2 permit
market price, can be considered as (real) option contracts. It is natural to interpret
such projects as contracts whose value derives from the future CO2 spot permit price.
Similarly, any technological abatement investment or production process modification
can be valued in terms of saved costs from purchasing emission permits or revenue
from the sales of extra unused permits. As mentioned in Section 3, Chao and Wilson
(1993) used this argument in order to identify a plausible reason for the difference
between the marginal cost of running abatement technologies such as scrubbers and
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Endogenous Price Dynamics of Emission Allowances 21
the emission allowance price. They called this difference the option premium. This is
the first article that discovers the option-value implicitly embedded in the value of an
emission permit. In line with this consideration, an option where the underlying is any
sort of tradable permit is in fact a compound option.
In this section, we propose a closed-form pricing formula for European-style
options. Let us construct two portfolios at time t. The first one is a European
Call option with a pay-off (ST − K)+ at maturity, the second one corresponds to
(P− K) / P units of emission permits. According to our model, at time T there are
only two possible states for the price of emission permits ST , i.e. {0,P} , therefore both
portfolios generate the same profit at maturity:{
P− K, if ST = P
0, if ST = 0. (18)
In the absence of arbitrage opportunities, the two portfolios must have the same price
at initial time. Therefore, the following option pricing formula is obtained:
CE(t) = P− KP · St,
where CE(t) is the Call price at time t, t < T . Similarly, let us consider a new portfolio
long in a European Put with pay-off at maturity (K − ST)+ and short in one risk-less
bond that generates a pay-off equal to the strike price K at maturity T . This portfolio
has the following final pay-off at time T :{−K if ST = P
0 if ST = 0. (19)
A portfolio long in a European Call CE and short in one emission permit generates
the same pay-off as in (19).
The absence of arbitrage opportunities generates then the following option-pricing
formula for the European Put PE(t):
PE(t) = e−r(T−t) · K + CE(t)− St
= K ·
(
e−r(T−t) − St
P
)
, (20)
where r is the risk-free interest rate. Obviously, the right-hand side of Equation
(20) is positive because, as shown previously, the upper bound of the price of emis-
sion permits is the discounted penalty. Equation (20) corresponds to the Put–Call
parity.
Although options traded on exchanges like the European Climate Exchange are gen-
erally options on forwards, we tested the validity of this formula pricing call and put
options with maturity December 2007. The empirical performance of the closed-form
formula relative to the well-known Black-Scholes-Merton formula is encouraging.
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22 M. Chesney and L. Taschini
Results are available from the authors upon request. Although we reckon that this pric-
ing formula is affected by the model assumption and that its utility is rather limited for
option-pricing purposes, we believe that it expresses an interesting relationship.
7. Conclusion
Distinguishing between pollution abatement policies in the short and long term for
those companies covered by market-based environmental regulations, we model the
endogenous price dynamics of marketable permits under asymmetric information,
allowing banking and borrowing, in a two-firms multi-period setting. We extend the
model to more than two firms. Each firm’s pollution emission follows an exogenously
given stochastic process. At maturity, firms try to reconcile their permit holding with
the accumulated emissions: if a firm’s permit holding is less than its accumulated pol-
lution, it has to pay a penalty for each permit in shortage at a pre-determined rate. The
optimization problem of each firm and the market-clearing condition in each period
determine the traded permit quantities and the equilibrium permit price. In the article,
we prove that the price path of emission permits depends on the future probability of
a shortfall in permits, the penalty that will be paid in the event of a shortfall, and the
discount rate. The model is solved numerically in in the two-firms multi-period set-
ting, and statistical features are discussed. Finally, we derive and discuss a closed-form
pricing formula for European-style options based on the equilibrium model proposed.
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Notes
1The theory of emissions trading and the economic benefit over traditional command-and-control
approaches to environmental regulation are discussed in detail by Baumol and Oates (1988) and Tietenberg
(1985).
2It involves the replacement of high-carbon (sulfur) fuels with low-carbon (sulfur) alternatives. The most
common form of fuel switching in the United States is the replacement of high-sulfur coal with a low-sulfur
coal. In Europe, coal is typically replaced with natural gas.
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Endogenous Price Dynamics of Emission Allowances 23
3Hedging strategies can be constructed by means of futures contracts or by introducing option instruments
(the first option contract on CO2 was traded in October 2005 between the French electricity company EDF
and the Amsterdam-based company Statkraft). Futures are traded both over-the-counter (OTC) and on
several exchanges.
4According to environmental terminology, spatial trading means that a unit can reduce its emissions below
its allocated number of allowances, transferring its unused permits to other units within the same company
or selling them to other companies or brokers. Conversely, it can decide not to abate its emissions but to
purchase allowances covering emissions above its allocation.
5It should be understood that the equality between permit price and marginal abatement costs breaks down
as soon as the excess of the permit supply over the expected accumulated pollution is evident, as shown in
the numerical solution part of the article.
6It is important to note that currently there is no commercially available end-of-the-stack technology to
extract carbon dioxide.
7In Fehr and Hinz (2006), the coincidence of the equilibrium permit price with the resolution of social
planner problem is a result of the model since fuel-switching is considered as a perfect substitute of emission
permits.
8The measure P refers to the historical probability. We refer to Carmona and Hinz (2011) for a discussion
and evaluation of the risk neutral pollution dynamics under an equivalent measure Q.
9It is worth noting that Equation (5) corresponds to the equilibrium permit price described in theorem 1 of
Fehr and Hinz (2006).
10An analysis of the interests of the various players in the market (governments, financial institutions, indus-
trials and energy companies and NGOs) might lead to a different interpretation of permit price dynamics
in the EU ETS. For instance, one might investigate the case where players can take a speculative approach
by selling off permits when the allowance price is high, and purchasing them back later on if in a permit
need situation or if the permit price is conveniently low. The study of their impact on the emission market
is left for future research.
11Section 6 briefly describes these certificates.
12This is an assumption we required for model tractability. However, from a practical point of view, the EU
ETS covers five different industrial sectors and almost 11.500 installations in 27 European countries. So, it
is plausible that two companies, although belonging to the same industrial sector, are affected by different
technical, commercial and operational factors.
13We described above the practical implications of this mathematical simplification.
14The particular feedback effect has been captured through BSDEs when modelling the energy production
sector – see the work by Schwarz and Howison (2010) and Carmona et al. (2010).
References
Bahn, O., Büler, B., Kypreos, S. and Lüthi, H. J. (1999) Modelling an international market of CO2 emission
permits, International Journal of Global Energy Issues, 12(5), pp. 283–291.
Baumol, W. J. and Oates, W. E. (1988) The Theory of Environmental Policy (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press).
Benz, E. and Trück, S. (2009) Modeling the price dynamics of CO2 emission allowances, Energy Economics,
31(1), pp. 4–15.
Brigo, D., Mercurio, F., Rapisarda, F. and Scotti, R. (2004) Approximated moment-matching dynamics for
basket-options simulation, Quantitative Finance, 4(1), pp. 1–16.
Carmona, R., Delarue, F., Gilles-Edouard, E. and Touzi, N. (2010) Singular forward-backward stochastic
differential equations and emissions derivatives. Working Paper HAL 00555591 Ecole Politechnique.
Available at http://hal-unice.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00555591_v2/ (accessed 1 Dec 2011).
Carmona, R. and Hinz, J. (2011) Risk-neutral modeling of emission allowance prices and option valuation,
Management Science, 57(8), pp. 1453–1488.
Chao, H. and Wilson, R. (1993) Option value of emission allowances, Journal of Regulatory Economics,
5(3), pp. 233–249.
Coase, R. (1960) The problem of social cost, Journal of Law and Economics, 3(1), pp. 1–44.
Do
wn
loa
de
d b
y [
LS
E 
Li
bra
ry]
, [L
uc
a T
asc
hin
i] 
at 
08
:55
 21
 Fe
bru
ary
 20
12
 
24 M. Chesney and L. Taschini
Cronshaw, M. B. and Kruse, J. B. (1996) Regulated firms in pollution permit markets with banking, Journal
of Regulatory Economics, 9(2), pp. 179–189.
Dales, J. (1968) Pollution Property and Prices (Toronto, ON: University of Toronto Press).
Daskalakis, G., Psychoyios, D. and Markellos, R. (2009) Modeling CO2 emission allowance prices and
derivatives: evidence from the european trading scheme, Journal of Banking and Finance, 33(17),
pp. 1230–1241.
Farzin, Y. H. and Kort, P. M. (2000) Pollution abatement investment when environmental regulation is
uncertain, Journal of Public Economic Theory, 2(2), pp. 183–212.
Fehr, M. and Hinz, J. (2006) A Quantitative Approach to Carbon Price Risk Modeling (Zurich: Institute of
Operations Research, ETH).
Geman, H. and Yor, M. (1993) Bessel processes, asian options, and perpetuities, Mathematical Finance,
3(4), pp. 349–375.
Hidalgo, I., Szabö, L., Ciscar, J. C. and Soria, A. (2005) Technological prospects and CO2 emission trading
analysis in the iron and steel industry: a global model, Energy, 30(5), pp. 583–610.
Insley, M. C. (2003) On the option to invest in pollution control under a regime of tradable emission
allowances, Canadian Journal of Economics, 36(4), pp. 860–883.
Montgomery, W. (1972) Markets in licenses and efficient pollution control programs, Journal of Economic
Theory, 5(3), pp. 395–418.
Paolella, M. S. and Taschini, L. (2008) An econometric analysis of emission–allowances prices, Journal of
Banking and Finance, 32(10), pp. 2022–2032.
Pigou, A. (1918) The Economics of Welfare (London: Macmillan Press).
Rubin, J. D. (1996) A model of intertemporal emission trading, banking, and borrowing, Journal of
Environmental Economics and Management, 31(3), pp. 269–286.
Schennach, S. M. (2000) The economics of pollution permit banking in the context of Title IV of the 1990
Clean Air Act Amendments, Journal of Environmental Economics andManagement, 40(3), pp. 189–210.
Schwarz, D. and Howison, S. (2010) Risk-Neutral Pricing of Financial Instruments in Emission Markets
(Oxford: Mathematical Institute, University of Oxford).
Seifert, J., Uhrig-Homburg, M. and Wagner, M. (2008) Dynamic behavior of CO2 spot prices, Journal of
Environmental Economics and Managements, 56(2), pp. 180–194.
Szabö, L., Hidalgo, I., Ciscar, J. C. and Soria, A. (2006) CO2 emission trading within the European Union
and Annex B countries: the cement industry case, Energy Policy, 34(1), pp. 72–87.
Taschini, L. (2010) Environmental economics and modeling marketable permits, Asian Pacific Financial
Markets, 17(4), pp. 325–343.
Tietenberg, T. (1985) Emission trading: an exercise in reforming pollution policy. Working Paper, Resources
for the Future, Washington, DC.
Zhao, J. (2003) Irreversible abatement investment under cost uncertainties: tradable emission permits and
emissions charges, Journal of Public Economics, 87(12), pp. 2765–2789.
Appendix A
The following objective function has to be minimized with respect to X0
H ≡
S0 · X0 + e−ηTEP
[(
4
σ 2
·Q0 · Azσ 2T/4 −N0 − X0
)+
· P
] , (21)
and denoting AνT =
∫ T
0 e
2(Ws+νs)ds, ν: = 1
σ
· (µ− σ 22 ).
The law of Azt is P (Azt ∈ dx) = ϕ(t, x)dx, where z := 2νσ ,
ϕ(t, x) = xν−1 1
(2pi3t)1/2
e
(
pi2
2t − 12x− ν
2 t
2
) ∫ ∞
0
yνe−
1
2 xy
2
ϒy(t)dy,
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Endogenous Price Dynamics of Emission Allowances 25
ϒr(t) =
∫ ∞
0
e−
y2
2t · e−r(cosh y) · sinh(y) · sin
(piy
t
)
dy.
Computing the FOC the following is obtained:
S0 = e−ηT · P · P
[
Azσ 2T/4 >
δ0 · σ 2
4Q0
]
.
Therefore, we can express the emission allowance price as a function of the penalty
and the probability of permit shortage:
S0 = e−ηT · P ·
∫ ∞
δ0·σ 2/4Q0
P
[
Azσ 2T/4 ∈ dx
]
.
For a simple analytical interpretation of the problem we can assume T = !t, where
!t is a small time interval, and approximate the cumulative pollution process with its
discrete representation: ∫ T
0
Qsds = Q0e
(
µ− σ22
)
!t+σW!t ·!t.
Substituting in the objective function it follows:
H ≡
{
S0 · X0 + e−ηTEP
[(
Q0e
(
µ− σ22
)
!t+σW!t ·!t−N0 − X0
)+
· P
]}
. (22)
Computing the FOC it follows:
S0 = e−ηT · P · EP
[
1
Q0e
(
µ− σ22
)
!t+σW!t ·!t>N0+X0
]
= e−ηT · P · P
[
Q0e(µ−
σ2
2 )!t+σW!t ·!t > N0 + X0
]
,
moving on from this, we express the price as a function of the penalty and the
probability of permit shortage and the results of Equation (5) are obtained.
Appendix B
The following objective function has to be minimized with respect to X1,T−!t:
H ≡ {ST−!t · X1,T−!t + e−η!tEP [ST · X1,T |F 1T−!t]} .
Deriving the FOCs, we arrive at Equation (10). To explicitly model the presence
of asymmetric information regarding emission levels as explained in Section 4.2, we
consider the discrete approximation for the pollution processes and obtain
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26 M. Chesney and L. Taschini
P
(∫ T
0
Q1,sds > δ1,T−!t
)
= P
Q1,T−!t · e
(
µ1−
σ21
2
)
·!t+σ1W!t ·!t > δ1,T−!t −
∫ T−!t
0
Q1,sds

= '(d1,T−!t),
where d1,T−!t is defined in Section 4.2. Similarly
EP
[
1
δ1,T−!t>
∫ T
0 Q1,sds
|F 1T−!t
]
=
{
0 if
∫ T−!t
0 Q1,sds ≥ δ1,T−!t
'(−d1,T−!t) else
and
EP
[
1∫ T
0 Q2,sds>δ2,T−!t
|F 1T−!t
]
=

1 if
∫ T−2!t
0 Q2,sds ≥ δ2,T−!t
'(d lag2,T−!t) else ,
where d lag2,T−!t is defined in Section 4.2. Noting that
'(d1,T−!t)+'(−d1,T−!t) ·'(d lag2,T−!t) = 1−'(−d1,T−!t) ·'(−d lag2,T−!t),
and letting P1T−!t := '(−d1,T−!t) ·'(−d lag2,T−!t), it follows that
ST−!t =
{
e−η!t · P if ∫ T−!t0 Q1,sds ≥ δ1,T−!t or ∫ T−2!t0 Q2,sds ≥ δ2,T−!t.
e−η!t · P · [1− P1T−!t] else
The same computation holds for Equation (12).
Appendix C
The following objective function has to be minimized with respect to X1,T−2!t:
H ≡ {ST−2!t · X1,T−2!t + e−η!tEP [ST−!t · X1,T−!t + e−η!t · ST · X1,T |F 1T−2!t]} .
Computing the FOC, the following is obtained:
0 = ST−2!t + e−η!t EP
[
ST−!t · ∂X1,T−!t
∂X1,T−2!t
+ X1,T−!t · ∂ST−!t
∂X1,T−2!t
]
because by Equation (7), ST = {0,P}, hence X1,T · ∂ST∂X1,T−2!t = 0.
Moreover, considering the existence of a lag-effect due to the presence of asymmetric
information and assuming that
∂X1,T−(j−1)!t
∂X1,T−j!t
= −1, ∂X1,T−(j−k)!t
∂X1,T−j!t
= 0 where k ∈ [2, j] k ∈ N, (23)
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Endogenous Price Dynamics of Emission Allowances 27
it follows
∂X1,T
∂X1,T−2!t
= 0.
The previous assumptions are introduced for the sake of tractability of the model.
A rigorous mathematical approach requires the introduction of backward–forward
stochastic differential equations (BFSDEs) in order to model the decision problem.14
In fact, it is not sufficient to solve a stochastic dynamic programming problem since
at each time step (T − j!t) the control variable (the quantity of permits to buy or to
sell) is a function of the previous quantity of permits traded ((T − (j + h)!t), where
h ∈ [1,T/!t− j] h ∈ N) and of the future quantity of permits that will be traded
((T − (j − k)!t), where k ∈ [1, j] k ∈ N).
Let us define
a1 =
(
δ1,T−2!t + X 1,T−!t −
∫ T−!t
0
Q1,sds
)
, b lag2 =
(
δ2,T−2!t + X 2,T−!t −
∫ T−2!t
0
Q2,sds
)
,
since X1,s = −X2,s ∀ s ∈ [0,T − 1] . Let us first consider the case where the total
emissions,
∫ T−2!t
0 Q1,sds, are below the net amount of permits, δ1,T−2!t. Contingent
on this condition, and recalling Equation (11), we can expand ∂ST−!t/∂X1,T−2!t as
follows:
∂ST−!t
∂X1,T−2!t
= ∂
∂X1,T−2!t
[
e−η!t · P
[
1−'(−d1,T−!t) ·'(−d lag2,T−!t)
]]
(24)
= e−η!t · P · φ(−d1,T−!t) · ∂d1,T−!t
∂X1,T−2!t
·'(−d lag2,T−!t)
+ e−η!t · P ·'(−d1,T−!t) · φ(−d lag2,T−!t) ·
∂d lag2,T−!t
∂X1,T−2!t
.
Using Conditions (23), the following equations are obtained:
∂d1,T−!t
∂X1,T−2!t
= 1
σ1
√
!t
· −1(
Q1,T−!t ·!t) /a1 · (Q1,T−!t ·!t) · (a1)−2 · ∂a1∂X1,T−2!t = 0,
∂d lag2,T−!t
∂X1,T−2!t
= 1
σ2
√
2!t
· −1(
Q2,T−2!t · 2!t) /b lag2 ·
(
Q2,T−2!t · 2!t) · (b lag2 )−2 · ∂b lag2∂X1,T−2!t = 0;
and hence (∂ST−!t)/(∂X1,T−2!t) = 0. When the total emissions, ∫ T−2!t0 Q1,sds, have
already passed δ1,T−2!t, the spot price of the emission allowances at time T −
2!t is simply equal to the discounted penalty, e−η!t · P. Yet we have that
(∂ST−!t)/(∂X1,T−2!t) = 0. Thus, when total emissions do not exceed the net amount
of permits, the spot price is
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28 M. Chesney and L. Taschini
ST−2!t = e−η!t · EP [ST−!t|F 1T−2!t]
= e−η2!t · P · {1− EP [P1T−2!t|F 1T−2!t]} . (25)
Otherwise, the spot price is simply equal to e−η2!t · P.
Similarly, solving the minimization problem corresponding to company i = 2, when
total emissions do not exceed the net amount of permits it follows:
ST−2!t = e−η!t · EP [ST−!t|F 2T−2!t]
= e−η2!t · P · {1− EP [P2T−2!t|F 2T−2!t]} . (26)
Otherwise, the spot price is simply equal to e−η2!t · P.
We generalize the proof for the time step T − j!t considering the following objective
function that has to be minimized with respect to X1,T−j!t:
H ≡
{
ST−j!t · X1,T−j!t + e−η!tEP
[ j∑
h=1
e−η(h−1)!tST−(j−h)!t · X1,T−(j−k)!t|F 1T−j!t
]}
,
Computing the FOC, it follows:
ST−j!t · ∂X1,T−j!t
∂X1,T−j!t
=
−e−η!tEP
[ j∑
h=1
e−η(h−1)!tST−(j−h)!t · ∂X1,T−(j−h)!t
∂X1,T−j!t
+ X1,T−(j−h)!t · ∂ST−(j−h)!t
∂X1,T−j!t
|F 1T−j!t
]
.
When the total emissions,
∫ T−j!t
0 Q1,sds, have already passed the net amount of per-
mits, δ1,T−j!t, the spot price of the emission allowances at time T − j!t is simply equal
to the discounted penalty, e−ηj!t · P. Otherwise, using Conditions (23) and Equation
(24), the following equation is obtained:
ST−j!t = e−η!tEP
[
ST−(j−1)!t|F 1T−j!t
]
,
hence
ST−j!t = e−η!tEP
[
e−η(j−1)!t · P ·
{
1− EP
[
P1T−j!t|F 1T−(j−1)!t
]}
|F 1T−j!t
]
= e−ηj!t · P ·
{
1− EP
[
P1T−j!t|F 1T−j!t
]}
.
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Appendix D
Let us define I = {1, 2, . . . , I} the set of relevant companies. The existence of asym-
metric information is modelled assuming that each company i observes its accumulated
pollution process and the accumulated (and aggregated) pollution process of the I–
companies with a lag, where I− := I − i. Modelling the emission permit price in
a multi-period and multi-firm framework requires solving I minimization problems
at each time step k ∈ [1, 2, . . . ,T/!t]. Along the line of Brigo et al. (2004), one
can approximate the cumulative pollution process, QI−,t =∑Ij=1,j )=i Qj,t, with a new
geometric Brownian motion and obtain I emission price equations as described in
Section 4.2:
ST−k!t = e−ηk!t · P · {1− EP [P iT−k!t|F iT−k!t]} ,
where
P iT−k!t =
{
0 if
∫ T−k!t
0 Qi,sds ≥ δi,T−k!t or
∫ T−k!t
0 QI−,sds ≥ δI−,T−k!t
'(−di,T−k!t) ·'(−d lagI−,T−k!t) else .
Using constant drift and volatility terms, {µ ∈ RI and σ ∈ R+I}, and relying on the
standard technique of the methods of moments, we can determine the parameters of
the new approximated geometric Brownian motion QI−,t,
dQI−,t
QI−,t
= µI − dt+ σI − dWI−,t,
whereWI− is a Brownian motion and
µI− = 1t ln
(∑I
j=1, j )=i Qj,0eµj t∑I
j=1, j )=i Qj,0
)
, σ 2I− =
1
t
ln
∑Ij, k=1, j, k )=i Qk,0Qj,0e(µk+µj+ρk,jσkσj)t(∑I
j=1Qj,0eµj t
)2
 .
Hence, when the total emissions have not passed the cap, we determine the equi-
librium permit price solving a system of I equations. More precisely, we numerically
evaluate the quantity of permits that satisfies the following equalities at each time step
k ∈ [1, 2, . . . ,T/!t]:
EP
[
'(−di,T−!t) ·'(−d lagI− ,T−!t)|F iT−k!t
]
= EP
[
'(−dj,T−!t) ·'(−d lagI− ,T−!t)|F jT−k!t
]
, (27)
(for {i, j} ∈ I and i )= j) and the market-clearing condition ∑Ii=1 Xi,T−k!t = 0, for a
given set of parameters {µ ∈ RIσ and Q0 ∈ R+I and N0 ∈ N+I} that characterize the I
pollution processes.
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